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PASSPORTS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 215 (b) OF
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1952 HELD TO PRE-
CLUDE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS
WHO TRAVEL INTO GEOGRAPHICALLY RESTRICTED AREAS,
United States v. Laub (U.S. 1967).
Appellees were organizers and leaders of the "Ad Hoc Student
Committee for Travel to Cuba," also known as the "Permanent
Student Committee for Travel to Cuba."'- Their purpose was to
recruit a group of United States citizens who would travel to Cuba
to observe and formulate an objective opinion of the Cuban situation.2
On June 25, 1963, appellees and followers, totaling 58, departed
from Kennedy International Airport, and after circuitous routing,3
arrived in Havana on June 29, 1963. Following a two month visit, the
group returned to the United States.4 Throughout the entire journey,
appellees possessed unrevoked and unexpired passports which were
not, however, specifically validated for travel to Cuba, an area re-
stricted to American travel.5
Appellees were subsequently indicted and charged with conspiracy
to violate section 215 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
19521 which makes unlawful the entrance into or departure from the
1 Many facts missing from the Supreme Court's opinion are detailed in the report
of the lower court, United States v. Laub, 253 F. Supp. 433, 436-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).2 The evidence suggested that the Committee may have been formed in reaction to
the United States' severance of diplomatic relations with Castro's Cuban government on
January 3, 1961, and the following missile crisis in October, 1962. Id. at 436.
a The group travelled from Kennedy International Airport to Paris; from Paris they
proceeded to Havana with stops in Czechoslovakia, Ireland, and Newfoundland. Id. at
440-41.
4 On their return, the group made stops in Spain, Bermuda, and the Azores. Id. at
441.
G Formerly Cuba was exempt from passport requirements. 22 C.F.R. § 53.3(b) (1958
rev.). Upon a break of diplomatic relations with Cuba, the State Department excluded
Cuba from the exemption, 22 C.F.R. § 53.3 (1965 ed.) ; at the same time the Secretary
of State announced that travel to Cuba would be restricted. State Department Press
Release No. 24, January 16, 1961, 44 DaP'T STATE BULL. 178.
6 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
7 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1964) [hereinafter cited as § 215(b)]. Section 215 in perti-
nent part states:
(a) When the United States is at war or during the existence of any na-
tional emergency proclaimed by the President .. . and the President shall find
that the interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions
in addition to those provided otherwise than by this section be imposed upon
the departure of persons from and their entry into the United States
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United States without a valid passport when there exists a state of
war or national emergency." After the district court granted appellees'
motion to dismiss,9 the Government, appealing directly 10 to the
United States Supreme Court, contended that section 215 (b) must be
given a broader meaning in order to prohibit travel to areas restricted
by the State Department. Held, affirmed: Section 215 (b) does not
make criminal those entries into and departures from the United
States by its citizens who, although bearing valid passports, travel to
restricted areas. United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967).11
The passport policy of the United States and its attending confusion,
subjected to heavy criticism for nearly two decades,'12 has been greatly
clarified by the Supreme Court in recent years. 3 For example, in 1958,
(b) . . . it shall . . . be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to
depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States
unless he bears a valid passport.
(c) Any person who shall willfully violate any of the provisions of this
section, or of any order or proclamation of the President promulgated . . .
shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $5,000, or, if a natural person,
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both ... (emphasis added).
8 The national emergency, continuing through appellees' visit and presently in exis-
tence, was originally proclaimed by President Truman on December 16, 1950. Presi-
dential Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (1950). The President, then, made the
proclamation of national emergency as required by section 215 on January 17, 1953.
Presidential Proclamation No. 3004, 18 Fed. Reg. 489 (1953).
9 253 F. Supp. 433 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (Zavatt, C.j., writing a lengthy and compre-
hensive opinion).
10 Jurisdiction was based on 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964), whereby an appeal may be
made by the United States from the district court directly to the Supreme Court of the
United States in criminal cases involving the construction of the statute upon which
the indictment issued.
11 Accord, Travis v. United States, 385 U.S. 491 (1967) (companion to instant
case).
12 For historical reviews and criticisms of passport policy see 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 435-52 (1942); SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY PASSPORT PRO-
CEDURES OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON FREE-
DOM TO TRAVEL (1958); Goodman, Passports in Perspective, 45 TExAS L. REV. 221
(1966); Gould, The Right to Travel and National Security, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 334;
Parker, The Right to Go Abroad: To Have and to Hold a Passport, 40 VA. L. REV. 853
(1954); Comment, Unanswered Questions in Recent Passport Cases, 10 HASTINGS LJ.
290 (1959); Comment, The Future of American Passports as Restrictions on Travel,
60 Nw. U.L. REv. 511 (1965); Note, 50 CORNELt L.Q. 262 (1965).
For further discussion in this area see Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel,
56 COLUM. L. REv. 47 (1956); Ehrlich, Passports, 19 STAN. L. REV. 129 (1966);
Rauh & Pollitt, Restrictions of the Right to Travel, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 128 (1961);
Velvel, Geographical Restrictions on Travel: The Real World and the First Amendment,
15 KAN . REv. 35 (1966); Comment, The Passport Puzzle, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 260
(1956); Comment, Authority of the Secretary of State to Deny Passports, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 454 (1958); Comment, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional
Issues and judicial Review, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952); Note, 3 STAN. L. REV. 312
(1951).
13 On an early occasion, the Court ruled that a United States citizen who willfully
and knowingly used a passport secured by a false statement was guilty of an offense
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the Court in Kent v. Dulles4 held that the right to travel is "a part of
the 'liberty' of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process
under the Fifth Amendment."' 5 Six years later in Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State,'6 the Court declared section 6 of the Subversive Activ-
ities and Control Act of 195017 unconstitutional. The statute in ques-
tion made unlawful the application for or use of a passport by
members of a Communist organization with knowledge or notice of
the statutory provisions. In 1965, the Court decided in Zemel v.
Ruskh 8 that the Secretary of State may properly restrict travel by re-
fusing to validate passports to certain countries where restrictions on
travel to those areas would be in the interest of national security.
Although the Zemel Court was asked to decide whether section
215 (b) could be applied to those who travel in violation of an area
restriction, it chose to defer its answer until a more concrete factual
under the Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 227, when such statements are used
for purposes of establishing his identity and citizenship and consequent right to re-enter
this country from abroad. Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335 (1941); accord,
Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342 (1941) (companion case).
The lower court in Laub -noted that appellees could have been indicted by a grand
jury under a similar statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (1964), which makes unlawful the
knowledgeable making of false statements in application for passports. 253 F. Supp. at
435.
14 357 U.S. 116 (1958). Prior to Kent several lower courts had concluded the exis-
tence of a "right" to travel of which a citizen could not be deprived because of his
political beliefs or associations without due process under the fifth amendment. See
Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957), re'd sub nom. Kent v. Dulles, supra;
see also Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Dayton v. Dulles, 146
F. Supp. 876 (D.D.C. 1956), aff'd, 254 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957), reed, 357 U.S.
144 (1958) ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952); cf. Boudin v. Dulles,
136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
15 357 U.S. at 125.
16 378 U.S. 500 (1964). The reasoning followed by the Aptheker court is criticized
in The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 192 (1964). A number of
lower court decisions were reversed by Aptheker. See e.g., Copeland v. Secretary of
State, 226 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated and remanded, 378 U.S. 588 (1964);
Mayer v. Rusk, 224 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C. 1963), vacated and remanded, 378 U.S. 579
(1964) ; Flynn v. Rusk, 219 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1963), revd sub norm. Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, supra.
17 64 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).
18 381 U.S. 1 (1965). Noted in The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HAMV. L. Rnv.
56, 123 (1965). Criticized in Note, 1966 DUKE L.J. 233 and Note, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
470 (1966).
Earlier lower court cases had determined that section 215(b) granted power to re-
fuse validation of passports to restricted areas. See Porter v. Herter, 278 F.2d 280 (D.C.
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 837 (1960) ; Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d
905 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959); Frank v. Herter, 269 F.2d 245
(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959). Worthy and Frank are
noted and criticized in Note, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1610 (1960). See also MacEwan v.




situation presented itself.19 This year Laub has answered in the nega-
tive the question which the Zemel Court refused to decide.
In Laub the Court resolved the question exclusively by statutory
construction. The two relevant statutes were the Passport Act of 192620
and section 215(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952.21 The Passport Act of 1926 is non-penal in nature and simply
announces that the power to issue and grant passports rests in the
Secretary of State "under such rules as the President shall designate
and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States . *... ,22 The
Zemel Court described the effect of this act in the following lan-
guage:
We think that the [Passport Act] embodies a grant of authority
to the Executive to refuse to validate passports of United States
citizens for travel to Cuba. . . . [I]ts language is surely broad
enough to authorize area restrictions, and there is no legislative
history indicating an intent to exclude such restrictions from the
grant or authority .... 23
Unlike the Passport Act of 1926, section 215 (b) 4 is criminal in
nature and authorizes punishment for entry into or departure from the
United States without a valid passport. In construing this section, the
Court considered, inter alia, evidence given during congressional
hearings25 including explanations of customary practices of the State
19 But cf. United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 82 n.7 (1964) (dictum). "However,
it may be observed that a trip to Cuba would have been lawful only if appellees had
had passports specifically endorsed for travel to Cuba."
20 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964).
iT]he Secretary of State may grant and issue passports . . . under such rules
as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United
States ....
21 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1964).
22 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964).
23 381 U.S. at 7-8.
24 A concise history of the derivation of section 215(b) is presented by the Laub
district court. 253 F. Supp. at 443. Section 215(b) is derived from Act of May 22,
1918, ch. 81, 40 Stat. 559 and Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252.
25 E.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the In-
ternal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1966); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm. on the Right to Travel, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
2, at 86 (1957); Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. on Department
of State Passport Policies, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1957).
In addition, the district court considered Committee Reports and Congressional De-
bates as to the predecessors of section 215(b) and concluded:
[The reports and debates surrounding the predecessors of section 215(b)]
clearly indicate that the Congress and the President, in those years [1918 and
1941) respectively, were concerned with the uncontrolled departure and entry
of citizens of the United States, who, it was believed, were acting in further-
1967]
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Department. Typical of the evidence offered at the congressional
hearings was the following exchange cited by the Court:
What does it mean when a passport is stamped "not valid to go to
country X"? ... [It] means that if the bearer enters country X
he cannot be assured of the protection of the United States. * * "
[but it] does not necessarily mean that if the bearer travels to country
X he will be violating the criminal law.26
The import of the above exchange may be inferred from a State De-
partment press release 27 announcing the area restriction on Cuba. The
reason given in the press release for such restriction was "the Depart-
ment's normal practice of limiting travel to those countries with
which the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations" and
"the U.S. Government's inability ...to extend normal protective
services to Americans visiting Cuba .. "28 The Court found that
throughout the State Department's history, this "normal practice" had
not included criminal sanctions. Furthermore, the press release made
no mention of any criminal penalties which might attach should one
travel in violation of such ban. As another aid, the Court pointed to
unsuccessful congressional efforts to enact legislation making it a
criminal offense for any citizen to travel to a restricted country.20
Such attempts evidence the non-existence of criminal sanctions for
those travelling in violation of area restrictions."0 Properly construed,
section 215 (b), while criminal in nature, was not criminal as applied
to the appellees who possessed valid passports although not specifi-
cally validated for travel to Cuba.
One criticism which may be made of Laub is the Court's failure to
reconsider the important constitutional question-whether the legis-
lature may properly delegate its functions relative to the making of
ance of th6 war efforts of foreign powers and to the detriment of the interests
of the United States. A system of border control was necessary. The manner
settled upon to control ingress and egress was to require all American citizens
to bear passports upon departure from and entry into the United States. So, in
1918 and then again in 1941, Congress enacted statutes which made unlawful
the departure and entry of American citizens without passports . . .(footnotes
omitted).
253 F. Supp. at 457.
26 Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. on Department of Slate
Passport Policies, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1957). 385 U.S. at 484-85.
27 State Department Press Release No. 24, January 16, 1961, 44 DP'T STATrl BULL.
178. 385 U.S. at 487-88 (appendix to opinion of Court).
28 Id.
20 H.R. 9069, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 388, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961); H.R. 9045, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 11621, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964) ; H.R. 11603, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964); S. 806, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959). 385 U.S. at 486.
30 385 U.S. at 486.
[Vol. 4
RECENT CASES
passport laws31 under the Passport Act of 1926.32 Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting in Zemel, quoted from artide I, section 1 of the Constitu-
tion which provides that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States-."33 He continued by argu-
ing that "if the Constitution is to control... the President is com-
pletely devoid of power to make laws regulating passports or anything
else."34 Citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,35 Justice
Black argued that "regulation of passports, just like regulation of
steel companies, is a law-making-not an executive, law-enforcing-
function."86 Nevertheless, the Laub Court rested its decision on statu-
tory construction, thereby avoiding the constitutional question.
Another criticism directed at the Laub Court's construction of
section 215 (b) has been suggested by one writer in response to the
district court opinion.3 7 He argues that since Congress gave the Secre-
tary of State power to control departure from or travel to the United
States by means of passport validation, one purpose of section 215 (b)
was to prohibit absolutely the departure of one who intended to
travel to specifically restricted countries.3 Prompted by the argument
31 The question has been decided in the affirmative. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 7-8.
Among the possible reasons for the Laub Court's avoiding the question are those
outlined by Ar. Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)
(concurring opinion):
2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it .... It is not the habit of the Court
to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to
a decision of the case.
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although prop-
erly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of. . . . Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other
a question of statutory construction . . . the Court will decide only the latter.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (footnotes omitted).
Another reason is that appellees were not questioning the constitutional validity
of the Passport Act of 1926. Rather, they were contesting the validity of section 215 (b)
as it applied to their situation. Note, however, that for the Secretary to have the power
to restrict travel to certain areas under section 215(b), he must first be delegated that
power under the Passport Act of 1926.
32 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964).
33 381 U.S. at 20.
34 Id.
35 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
36 381 U.S. at 21.
37 Ehrlich, Passports, 19 STAN. L. REv. 129 (1966).
38 Id. at 146 n.79.
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that no reference was made in the State Department press release to
criminal sanctions, 39 he argues that failure to mention criminal sanc-
tions would not seem to preclude use of the provision as an enforce-
ment mechanism. "That there were subsequent unsuccessful legisla-
tive efforts to clarify the power has little to do with whether it was
granted in 1952.'40
However imaginative, the writer's criticism neglects to consider
the "void-for-vagueness" concept. 41 If section 215 (b) were given its
apparent meaning, it would simply require a valid (unexpired and
unrevoked) passport for departure from or entry into the United
States. If, on the other hand, section 215(b) were construed by a
court to include an absolute prohibition on departure with intent to
travel to specifically restricted countries, then it would appear to be
unconstitutional for vagueness. On its face, section 215 (b) does not
proscribe that activity which the latter construction seeks to make
criminal. As the Laub Court stated, "criminal sanctions are not
supportable if they are to be imposed under 'vague and undefined
commands' ....142
Despite these criticisms, Laub may be praised for narrowing the
effect of Zemel which held that the Secretary of State may properly
restrict areas of foreign travel to United States citizens.43 Laub limits
Zemel by holding that no present criminal sanction will attach to
one's travel in violation of an area restriction.44 For those who find
themselves in the "unrestricted-right-to-travel" camp, Laub may be
termed a minor victory45 toward a goal similar to that expressed in
article 13 (2) of the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights
which states: "[E]veryone has the right to leave any country, in-
cluding his own, and to return to his own country."
HOWARD LEE HALM
39 44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 178 (1961).
40 Ehrlich, supra note 37, at 146 n.79. But cf. United States v. Laub, 253 F. Supp.
at 454-56.
41 See, e.g., Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 230-32 (1951), where the Court
said:
The essential purpose of the "void for vagueness" doctrine is to warn
individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct .... This Court
has repeatedly stated that criminal statutes which fail to give due notice
that an act has been made criminal before it is done are unconstitutional
deprivations of due process of law .... Impossible standards of specificity
are not required .... The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently
definite warning as to the prescribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices (footnotes omitted).
42 385 U.S. 487, citing Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959).
4 See material cited note 18 supra.
44 Cf. Ehrlich, supra note 37, at 146.
15 Cf. Comment, The Future of American Passports as Restrictions on Travel, 60
Nw. U.L. REV. 511, 528 (1965).
